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1. Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to discuss secure routing in Wireless Sensor networks. I have made an endeavor to 
present an analysis on the security of Directed Diffusion, a protocol used for routing in wireless sensor networks. 
Along with this the paper also discusses the various attacks possible on this routing protocol and the possible 
counter-measures to prevent theses attacks. 
 
2. Introduction 
The technological advancements in wireless communication and microelectronics have resulted in a growing 
interest in the field of wireless sensor networks. A sensor network involves deploying an array of sensors for 
distributed monitoring of real time events. The sensor networks have limited energy, as the sensor nodes are 
battery powered. The sensor nodes also have limited memory and computational capability and can be deployed 
in remote areas or inhospitable terrain. There has been an increasing use of sensor networks for life critical 
applications such as monitoring patients in hospitals and military applications. These applications make it 
important to have a good security infrastructure for sensor networks. The deployment of these networks in 
military applications and the limited power and memory, make the design of a security protocol very 
challenging. In this paper security issues in Directed diffusion are addressed. Directed Diffusion is a novel 
routing protocol for sensor networks. A look-in to possible attacks and counter measures is provided. Section 
3,briefly covers the directed diffusion protocol followed by a discussion on the possible attacks on this routing 
protocol. The paper is concluded with a brief analysis on the possible countermeasures to prevent such attacks. 
 
3. Directed Diffusion: An insight 
Directed Diffusion [1] is a data-centric, interest-based routing protocol. An interest is a request for a specific 
type of data. For ex: In a sensor network to monitor various properties of water in a lake, the interest could be a 
request for data on toxins to be sent every 10 seconds for the next 50 seconds from a particular area of the sensor 
network. This interest message would be sent as a packet. The node that sends out interests is referred to as the 
sink node. The sink node resends these interest packets periodically. A base station node normally does the 
interest dissemination. This node broadcasts its interests to all its neighbors in the network. This process is 
referred to as interest-dissemination.  The interests consists of the following parameters: 
Type of data required by the sink node 
Area of sensor network from which the data is required (X, Y co-ordinates) 
How often the data needs to be sent to the sink node? This is referred to as data refreshing rate. 
Expiration time 
Based on these parameters for the interest dissemination, a gradient is set-up in the reverse direction for data 
flow. This gradient is set-up in response to the interest dissemination instantiated by the sink node. This process 
of interest dissemination and the corresponding gradient establishment continues until we reach the nodes 
generating the events. These are referred to as source nodes. The data is routed through paths, which have a 
higher gradient value. Those nodes, which send out data more frequently to the sink node, would be positively 
reinforced.  This would mean that the paths to these nodes would obtain higher gradient values, by increasing the 
data refresh rate. The sink node must refresh and reinforce the interest once it begins to receive data from the 
source node. Also each node stores a copy of the interest it receives in an interest cache, before it forwards the 
interest. This is done to avoid routing loops and repeated flooding. Thus the directed diffusion is based on data 
centric routing where the sink node broadcasts the interest. 
 
4. Attacks on directed diffusion  
The possible attacks on directed diffusion protocol can be classified under: 
Denial of Service attacks 
Modification and spoofing of routing information 
Dropping or selective forwarding of data 
In the following sections these attacks along with the possible countermeasures against these attacks is 
discussed. 
Denial Of Service attacks 
The simplest form of the denial of service attack would require an attacker to deploy a malicious node with a 
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powerful transmitter and a large battery power. This would enable the attacker to jam the communications in the 
entire sensor network with his powerful transmitter. A normal malicious node would only be able to jam the 
communication link in its immediate vicinity. 
A second form of denial of service attack would involve spoofing negative reinforcements. A malicious node 
could spoof negative reinforcements to certain nodes. If the latter nodes communicate with the base station or a 
sink node via the malicious node, they would be denied service to the base station because of the spoofed 
negative reinforcements that they received from the malicious node. The figure below depicts this: 
 
Blocked sensor nodes 
Fig1: Simple DOS attack 
 
Modification and spoofing of routing information 
In Directed Diffusion the routing is done on the basis of interest dissemination and the corresponding gradient 
establishment. If a malicious node receives interests from the base station, it could replay the interest with itself 
listed as the base station. This would enable the malicious node to receive a copy of the events, which are sent to 
the base station. 
A malicious node can influence the other nodes to route data through it by spoofing positive and 
negative reinforcements and false data events. For example consider that a malicious node receives interests 
from the base station or a sink node. It adopts the following procedure 
Rebroadcasts the interests to its upstream nodes. Upstream is the direction from sink node to source 
node. 
Sends strong positive reinforcements to the upstream nodes. This would enable the malicious node to 
receive a steady flow of events from the its upstream nodes Send spoofed events at a high data rate to the sink 
node or base station This would make the base station to positively reinforce the malicious node as against the 
alternate routes, as the node is generating a steady stream of events. Thus the malicious node has successfully 
been able to include itself in the path of the base station and observes all packets sent to the base station  
The figure below depicts this: 
 
Nodes generating and sending event data as they have a high gradient path to malicious node 
Fig2: Spoofing Positive Reinforcements 
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(Also enables easy selective forwarding) 
Dropping or selective forwarding of data 
Most sensor networks are multi hop networks. These networks rely on all the nodes to correctly forward the 
messages. In this scenario a malicious node could drop or selectively forward only certain messages. If a 
malicious node drops all messages, it would be as good as the node not being present in the network. The sensor 
network is designed to adapt to this. But a more severe form of this attack would be if a malicious node 
selectively forwards only certain messages. With the spoofed positive and negative reinforcements discussed in 
the previous section, we saw how a malicious node can successfully include itself in the path of data flow. This 
now makes selective forwarding trivial. The malicious node can now forward only certain messages and 
suppress the rest. Thus once a malicious node includes itself in the path of data flow, the selective forwarding 
can be easily achieved. 
 
Countermeasures 
The following are some of the problems with the directed diffusion protocol, which make the protocol more 
vulnerable: 
The interest packet in the Directed diffusion protocol does not have any information regarding the sink 
node that generated the interest. There could be some provision to specify the identity of the sink node in the 
interest packet. This along with the encryption of the data would make spoofing interests difficult. 
The data packets received from the source nodes contain no information regarding the identity of the 
source node. This information coupled with encryption of data would to some extent prevent malicious nodes 
from spoofing high data rates to the base station. 
One of the useful steps that can be taken to prevent some of the attacks is to use encryption at the link 
layer. The nodes could share a key with the base station and thus data flow could be authenticated. It is vital that 
efficient symmetric key cryptographic schemes be employed. Public key cryptography would be too expensive 
and infeasible to use in sensor networks with the limited memory and computational capabilities of the nodes. 
The link layer encryption would prevent most external attacks against sensor networks. Internal attacks from 
compromised nodes are harder to defend against. One novel scheme of preventing some of the attacks would be 
for the base station to limit the number of neighbors a node can have. This would restrict the compromised node 
to communicating with its immediate neighbors. It would be very hard to defend against a denial of service 
attack if the malicious node has a strong transmitter. It is vital to design the security infrastructure into the 
routing protocol rather than trying to retrofit. With the challenges of limited node power and memory, the 
security for sensor networks is an open research issue. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This paper addresses some of the security issues for routing in sensor networks by taking an example of the 
directed diffusion protocol for analysis of the attacks and general possible countermeasures. Link layer 
encryption may be sufficient for external attacks, but compromised nodes within the network would be the most 
difficult attacks to prevent. This has to be achieved with careful and conscious designing of the routing protocol. 
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